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INTRODUCTION

In Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation,' and a shorter follow-up article,2 Professor Jerry Mashaw sets forth a preliminary but still very helpful
defense of the divergence of agency and judicial statutory interpretation. In
Mashaw's charting of the terrain, he notices, but does not have occasion to
explore, the relevance of the agency's chosen policymaking form-formal
adjudication, notice-and-comment rulemaking, or guidance, etc.-to its
approach to statutory interpretation. In view of the different forms and occasions for statutory interpretation by an agency, Mashaw remarks, "It
would be surprising for agency interpretive methodology to be invariant
across these differing contexts (although it may be)."' In this short sympo* Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law
School. I am grateful to the participants at the Agency Statutory Interpretation symposium at
Michigan State University Law School, as well as to Lisa Schultz Bressman, David Franklin,
Margaret Lemos, and Edward Rubin for comments on this contribution.
1. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices,and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation,57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501 (2005) [hereinafter
Norms, Practices,and the ParadoxofDeference].
2. Jerry L. Mashaw, ExploringAgency Statutory Interpretation,31 ADMIN. & REG.
LAW NEWS 6 (Spring 2006).
3. Mashaw, Norms, Practices,and the ParadoxofDeference, supra note 1, at 525.

HeinOnline -- 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 225 2009

226

Michigan State Law Review

[Vol. 2009:225

sium contribution, I take up this invitation to examine the relevance of the
agency's policymaking form to its approach to statutory interpretation.
The core point I wish to advance is a relatively basic one-namely,
that an agency's approach to statutory interpretation is in part a function of
the policymaking form through which it acts. My strategy is to examine
two of the most important policymaking forms-notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication-and to argue that the considerations that
distinguish agency and judicial interpretation have a markedly different
place in these two agency policymaking forms. For purposes of exposition,
I focus on two dimensions that distinguish agency and judicial statutory
interpretation: (1) the role of political influence in general, and presidential
direction in particular; and (2) the role of internal management constraints,
and considerations of budget in particular. As to these two dimensions,
agency statutory interpretation in formal adjudication is difficult to distinguish from judicial statutory interpretation. In contrast, when the agency
engages in notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is appropriately more influenced by political directions and internal management considerations. I
suggest that due process constraints that apply in both formal agency adjudication and judicial adjudication draw statutory interpretation in these two
contexts together, and distinguish both from agency statutory interpretation
in notice-and-comment rulemaking. These arguments, if correct (and I advance them tentatively here), highlight a neglected element of a classic issue
in administrative law-the agency's choice of policymaking form. The
agency's choice of policymaking form is conventionally understood to involve questions of procedure, the legal effect of the agency's product, and
the availability of judicial review.' Perhaps, in addition, the agency's
choice should be understood as informed by the difference in interpretive
constraints that accompany the agency's different policymaking forms.
I. INTERPRETATION, IMPLEMENTATION
At the outset, it is important to note that my discussion, following Mashaw's,' takes a capacious view of what counts as agency interpretation. In
particular, I treat "agency statutory interpretation" functionally as reflected
in the variety of forms through which an agency implements a statutewhether in a rule, an adjudicative decision, a guidance letter, or a decision
not to act. This broad view does not rely on distinguishing "interpretation"

4. M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Cm. L. REv.
1383, 1390 (2004).
5. Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-CenteredAdministrative Law? A
Dialogue with RichardPierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation,59 ADMIN. L. REv. 889,
893-903 (2007) [hereinafter Agency-Centered or Court-Centered.
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from policymaking in the agency's practice, but rather treats an agency's
implementation of a statute as its interpretation of it.6
I do not take this broad view as to what counts as agency statutory interpretation on the ground that it is conceptually or practically impossible to
distinguish the elements of an agency's decision that look more like policymaking-cost-benefit analysis, for instance-from those parts of what an
agency does that appear to be similar to aspects of what a court does when it
interprets a statute-an agency considering the scope of its jurisdiction, for
example-though doing so will not always be easy.' Rather the point of
taking such an inclusive view is to set up a comparison between how agencies specify the meaning and requirements of statutes and how courts do.
With that comparative purpose in mind, it does not make sense to identify
only an element of what an agency does in specifying the meaning of a statute as involving interpretation-or, for that matter, to identify only a slice
of the court's specification of the requirements of statute as its interpretation, as opposed to, say, its implementing doctrine.
This broad conception of what counts as agency statutory interpretation has clear implications for the argument for divergence of agency and
judicial interpretation. In particular, the more inclusive the account of
agency statutory interpretation, the more straightforward the argument becomes for divergence in interpretive approaches, as agencies do many
things that courts do not as part of their process of statutory implementation.
I do not see this terminological choice as a problem as long as one remains
self-conscious about its implications, for instance, by guarding against the
reflex to examine the agency's approach to interpretation solely with respect
to features that distinguish good judicial statutory interpretation-the current paradigm of legal interpretation-as opposed to the considerations that
are part of sound public administration
II. POLITICS IN AGENCY RULEMAKING AND ADJUDICATION
Two core premises animate the argument for divergence in agency and

judicial statutory interpretation: (1) "Agencies have a different institutional
role in our legal order than do courts,"' and (2) the interpretive commitments of the interpreter are in part a function of the interpreter's institutional role."o From these two premises, the argumentative path to exposing the
6. See id. at 897-98.
7. See id.
8. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How
Chevron Misconceives the Function ofAgencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADmiN. L. REv. 673,
677(2007).
9. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered,supra note 5, at 901.
10. Id.
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grounds for divergence in agency and judicial interpretive approaches is to
locate salient differences in institutional role.
Perhaps the most fundamental difference, and the difference with
which I shall begin, is that "agency officials are concededly political [actors,] ... [u]nlike judges."" As Professor Peter Strauss puts it:
[T]heir wages in theory and their resources in reality are hostage to the appropriations process; they spend much of their time testifying to congressional committees, responding to inquiries or demands from the President, members of Congress,
or assorted presidential or congressional offices; they may be called to account for
the decisions they take in ways a judge could never conceive for her function.' 2

Political oversight is a basic feature of agency life. Virtually all agencies remain in some dialogue with the White House on the implementation
of policy, and likewise face the recurrent prospect of being called to account for their decisions before congressional committees.14 At this high
level of abstraction, an agency implements its statute in a context in which
the agency as a whole is viewed as appropriately influenced by the views of
current politicians. The same is not conceded with regard to judges. As
Strauss sums up the point, "part of what distinguishes agencies from courts
in the business of statute-reading is that we accept a legitimate role for current politics in the work of agencies.""
The formal role of political contacts and direction, however, depends
on the form of the agency's policy implementation. Consider two very basic differences in the law governing formal adjudications and notice-andcomment rulemakings: (1) in adjudications, the APA prohibits ex parte contacts," including contacts with political actors," whereas in notice-andcomment rulemaking, the APA includes no such prohibition;" and (2) con11. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is not the Primary Official with Responsibility
to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 321,329 (1990).
12. Id
13. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the AdministrativeState: A CriticalLook at the PracticeofPresidentialControl, 105 MICH. L. REv. 47
(2006) (describing the presidential control model and agency experience in EPA with regulatory review by the White House).
14. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
61, 121-27 (2006) (describing the scope and mechanisms for congressional oversight of
agencies).
15. Strauss, supra note 11, at 335.
16. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2006).
17. See Prof'1 Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 547, 567 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1538-39 (9th
Cir. 1993).
18. See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553; Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, 391 F.3d 1255,
1266 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting well-established law that § 557(d)'s prohibitions on ex parte
contacts do not apply to rulemaking under § 553). Debate in the courts persists as to the
contours of a due process prohibition on ex parte contacts applicable to notice-and-comment
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templated and actual rulemakings are subject to regulatory review by
0MB,"' whereas formal adjudications have not been subject to OMB oversight.20
Strong background values support the prohibition on ex parte contacts
in formal adjudication, just as they support the prohibition in judicial adjudication. Ex parte contacts are generally thought to undermine the opportunity for litigants to rebut ex parte evidence and arguments, thus conflicting
with core due process ideas of fair play. 21 As Professor Thomas McGarity
notes, "[a]bsent any constraints on presidential intervention, it is possible
for affected parties to channel vital information and arguments to the agency
through the White House or OMB and for the agency to rely upon that information without first exposing it to the critical light of public comment." 22
Indeed, in the extreme case in which an ex parte presidential directive was
to dictate the outcome of an adjudication, it would violate the core principle
of Morgan v. United States23 that "[t]he one who decides must hear."24 The
official that purported to make the decision, the agency, would not be the
actual decisionmaker, and the actual decisionmaker, the President, would
not have satisfied even the minimum requirements of "hearing." 2
The distinct place of agency adjudication in the executive branch has
long been acknowledged. Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Myers v. United
rulemakings. Compare Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56-57 & n.125 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (embracing broad requirement of disclosure of ex parte contacts in notice-andcomment rulemaking based in due process, not the APA); Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 474-77 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (limiting Home Box Office's prohibition to
notice-and-comment proceedings involving "competing claims to a valuable privilege");
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to apply Home Box
Office to rulemaking involving general policymaking); Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 391 F.3d
at 1263, 1266 (noting Home Box Office was based on due process clause and limited by
Action for Children's Television and Sierra Club). But whatever residual prohibition on ex
parte contacts imposed by due process in notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is clear that its
prohibition is far less stringent than the prohibitions applicable in formal adjudication.
19. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), amended by Exec. Order No.
13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003) and by Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23,
2007), reprintedas amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497,
74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009) (revoking Exec. Order Nos. 13,258 and 13,422).
20. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866,3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), amended by Exec. Order
No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003) and by Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2,763 (Jan.
23, 2007), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (§3(d) defining "regulation" as
"agency statement of general applicability and further effect, which the agency intends to
have the force and effect of law"); Magill, supra note 4, at 1393 (noting that adjudications
are not subject to OMB review under Exec. Order No. 12,866).
21. Thomas 0. McGarity, PresidentialControl of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443,459 (1987).
22. Id at 458; see also Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).
23. 298 U.S. 468.
24. Id. at 481.
25. See id at 481-82.
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States26 clearly carves out adjudication from the class of decisions over
which the President may exert control. "[T]here may be duties of a quasijudicial character imposed on executive officers and members of executive
tribunals," the Myers Court notes, "whose decisions after hearing[s] affect
[the] interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in
a particular case properly influence or control."27 While this statement in
Myers is hardly a recipe for agency independence in adjudication, it at least
acknowledges that within the context of an adjudicative proceeding, agency
adjudicators must be isolated from political direction.
The leading contemporary vehicle for emphasizing this firm line prohibiting ex parte contacts (and directive influence) from executive branch
officials in the process of adjudication is PortlandAudubon Society v. Endangered Species Committee.28 The PortlandAudubon decision examined
the legality of political contacts with a seven-member Committee established under the Endangered Species Act to review requests of federal agencies for exceptions from the requirements of the Act. 29 After the Committee
granted one such exception, environmental groups sued the Committee arguing that the White House had contacted three members of the Committee
and urged them to vote for an exception.30 The PortlandAudubon court
held that the Committee's decision to grant an exception was subject to the
formal adjudication requirements of the APA, and that its prohibitions on ex
parte contacts applied to the President, as well as to lower-level officials."
In reaching this determination, the PortlandAudubon court reiterated the
basic principle that ex parte contacts, even by executive officials, are "antithetical to the very concept of an administrative court reaching impartial
decisions through formal adjudication."32 In sum, agency adjudicators must
purport to exclude political influence, even from the White House, in much
the same way that courts do.
In sharp contrast, in the context of notice-and-comment rulemaking,
the APA's prohibitions on ex parte contacts do not apply, and there has
been an embrace of the "basic need of the President and his White House
staff to monitor the consistency of executive agency regulations with Administration policy."" Indeed, courts and commentators have broadly en26. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
27. Id. at 135.
28. 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993).
29. Id. at 1537.
30. Id. at 1537-38.
31. Id. at 1543, 1545.
32. Id. at 1543; see also Prof I Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 547,
563 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that the prohibition on ex parte contacts serves as "an instrument of fair decisionmaking").
33. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM.
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dorsed the view that "[o]ur form of government simply could not function
effectively or rationally if key executive policymakers were isolated from
each other and from the Chief Executive" in the context of rulemakings.34
Regulatory review executive orders have formalized White House supervision over an agency's notice-and-comment rulemaking." By their terms,
the regulatory review orders do not apply to an agency's formal adjudication decisions 36 -nor, despite the efforts of some advocacy groups," do the
regulatory review orders impose formal oversight over the ways in which an
agency uses litigation to advance its goals.
Even recognizing that political preferences alone are generally not
viewed as sufficient reasons for regulation," it is hard to deny that the views
of political actors and, in particular, the views of White House officials have
an entirely different place in agency rulemaking and formal adjudication.
The choice of rulemaking or adjudication determines not only whether
White House support for an outcome provides a reason for the agency decisionmaker to adopt that outcome, but also whether the agency decisionmaker may even confer with political officials on the merits during the process
of decisionmaking. Viewed from within the cylinder of adjudication or
L. REV. 943, 960, 978-82 (1980) (defending restrictions on the President's ex parte contacts
in adjudication and the President's capacity to make ex parte contacts in rulemaking).
34. Costle, 657 F.2d at 406.
35. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), amended by Exec. Order No.
13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003) and by Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23,
2007), reprintedas amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497,
74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009) (revoking Exec. Orders 13,258 and 13,422).
36. See supra note 19.
37. See, e.g., Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Regulation by Litigation: Proposed
Executive
Order
on
Regulation
by
Litigation,
available
at
http://www.thecre.com/regbylit/index.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (advocating for an
executive order to "[rlequire OMB to review the litigation activities of federal agencies on an
annual basis, and to report to Congress, to ensure that the agencies do not use taxpayer dollars to engage in 'Regulation Through Litigation').
38. The Supreme Court's classic decision in Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), has long been read to
convey that political preferences are not sufficient to justify regulatory outcomes. See JERRY
L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 226 (1990) (noting the

"submerged yet powerful message" of State Farm is that "the political directions of a particular administration are inadequate to justify regulatory policy"); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing A Placefor Politics in Arbitrary-and-CapriciousReview, 119 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1353519 (draft at 1-5) (noting that under State
Farm arbitrary-and-capricious review does not permit agencies to justify their decisions in
political terms, and challenging that norm). In State Farm, then-Justice Rehnquist dissented
in part, suggesting that "[a] change in administration brought about by the people casting
their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal" of regulatory
policy. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Court's opinion did not respond to Justice Rehnquist's suggestion and implicitly
rejected it.
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rulemaking, the place of the President's views in the agency's interpretation
of a statute depends upon the agency's policymaking form.
A question, then, is whether it makes sense to look at agency action
confined within the context of formal adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking. It is clear that politics influences the agency's enforcement
priorities, and thus shapes the cast of cases that are presented to the agency
for adjudication. For instance, empirical studies show that the volume of
agency enforcement action is a function in part of the presidential administration." Likewise, agency enforcement staffs frequently, though not always, have high rates of success litigating before the agency's own Administrative Law Judges and Commission.4 0 Because the agency's enforcement
attorneys are not barred from contacts with political officials, they provide a
stable conduit through which the views of political officials regarding the
statute may enter adjudication. This highlights the presidential influence to
which Justice Taft intimated in Myers-although the President "can not in a
particularcase properly influence or control"4 ' an adjudication, the President may substantially affect agency adjudications over time, even when
agency heads are protected by for-cause removal standards.
Even if we were to accept, for the purposes of argument, that the positions the agency ends up adopting in formal adjudications are not demonstrably different from the positions the agency adopts in notice-and-comment
rulemakings-at least as to their correspondence to the policy positions of
the White House-there remains a basic dependence of agency statutory
interpretation on policymaking form. A broad convergence between the
agency's interpretations and the President's positions may result from many
factors, including the influence of the President's appointment powers and
informal contacts between agency adjudicators and members of the administration. But even such a convergence in fact does not alter the legal or
interpretive lens through which agency adjudicators must view the President's or other political actors' positions. In broad terms, the views of political actors should be, like the positions of other litigants, only as persuasive
as they intrinsically merit.
Some might also object that the apparent difference in the explicit role
for politics in agency action is actually a function of the type of agency at
issue-independent or executive-and not the policymaking form through
39. See, e.g., B. Dan Wood, Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC?, 34 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 503, 522-23 (1990) (documenting the difference in litigation activities of EEOC
between the Carter and Reagan administrations).
40. See, e.g., Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Does it Matter that the Prosecutor is Also the Judge? The Administrative Complaint Process at the FederalTrade Commission, 19 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 1, 5 (1998) (showing agency win rates in appeals to the Federal Trade Commission from ALJ decisions on mergers ranging from one
hundred percent to thirty eight percent).
41. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (emphasis added).
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which the agency acts. If the primary tool of presidential influence were
regulatory review, this objection might have more force. The regulatory
review orders do not subject independent agencies to the same controls that
apply to executive-branch agencies.42 But regulatory review is not the only
means of influence over agency officials. With regard to independent agencies, there is no legal barrier to White House communications regarding the
Administration's priorities. The fact that the President generally selects the
chairs of independent commissions is thought to facilitate consultation between the chairs and the White House on policy issues of importance.43
What triggers the strict ban on ex parte communications and the exclusion
of political direction within the process of decision is not the type of agency, but a particular policymaking form-namely, formal adjudication." For
instance, in PortlandAudubon, the relevant adjudicative body, the Endangered Species Committee, was comprised primarily of executive officials
(including the Secretaries of Agriculture, Army, Interior, the Administrators
of the EPA and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the
Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, as well as presidential appointees from the affected states).45 Despite the status of these members as part
of executive, not independent, agencies, the officials were still barred from
political communications in the context of a formal adjudication. This is
not to say that the executive versus independent agency distinction makes
no difference to the constraints faced by the agency in interpreting its statutes. The point, instead, is that the type of agency does not itself explain
the difference in the place of political influence in formal adjudication and
notice-and-comment rulemaking.
So we are left in a relatively familiar place in which the hard questions
concern how much, and in what ways, the views of the White House, members of Congress, or political actors may influence the agency's decisions.
We should expect our answers to those hard questions to depend in part on
the policymaking form through which the agency makes its decision.

42. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993) § 3(b) (defining agency
to exclude independent agencies), with id. at § 4(b), (c) (specifically including independent
agencies in duty to prepare regulatory plan), and id. at §§ 5-6 (excluding independent agencies from centralized regulatory review).
43. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation ofPowers and the FourthBranch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 590-91 (1984).
44. The APA's prohibitions on ex parte contacts also apply to the nearly defunct
category of formal rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d).
45. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1537
n.l (9th Cir. 1993).
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III. INTERNAL MANAGEMENT AND AGENCY POLICYMAKING FORM

Mashaw argues that another dimension of difference between agency
and judicial interpretation is that agencies "have much more reason than
courts to look at interpretation from the perspective of internal bureaucratic
or hierarchical control."46 We might distinguish two different elements of
internal bureaucratic management. First, internal management requires
providing sufficient guidance to actors throughout a complex structure, involving hierarchical and horizontal relationships, so that these actors may
implement their statutes consistently and effectively. Second, part of management is operating within a budget. For illustrative purposes, I focus on
the role of budget considerations in formal adjudication and notice-andcomment rulemaking. I propose for consideration the prospect that (1) a
legality principle associated with due process imposes a greater constraint
on the considerations an agency may take into account in formal adjudication than in notice-and-comment rulemaking, and (2) under that constraint,
budget factors have a different place in notice-and-comment rulemaking and
formal adjudication.
Consider as a starting point the idea that when government decisionmakers reach decisions to which due process applies they must follow
preexisting rules or norms, that is, a principle of "rule-obedience" applies.4 7
On this position, when a government decisionmaker does not apply preexisting norms in a particular case, the decision violates not only the applicable norms, but also this rule-obedience legality principle. To reach a decision based on rules other than those applicable is "the very antithesis of
accurate decisionmaking, since accuracy is the proper application of the law
to the case at hand."48 So in the context of a statutory dispute, the adjudicator must reach a decision in a way that could be described as applying the
statute to the case at hand. This due-process rule-obedience norm would be
violated by courts invoking considerations foreign to the statute and the
statutory scheme as a basis for their application of it. The line between
permissible and impermissible considerations will not be easy to draw in
every case, but that difficulty does not itself negate the prospect for some
such line.49

46. Mashaw, Norms, Practices,andthe ParadoxofDeference, supranote 1, at 519.
47. See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L.
REv. 1044, 1105 (1984).
48. Id.
49. I do not view this principle as inconsistent with Richard Pierce's point that
where a statute is silent as to a decisional factor, an agency should be permitted to consider
logically relevant factors, such as the effect of its decision on the policy underlying other
statutes or related problems within the agency's jurisdiction. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What
Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 67, 75
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The question, then, is whether this constraint has different implications as to the budget considerations that an agency may take into account in
notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication. I do not take it as
controversial that an agency as a whole should make decisions about how
best to implement its statute on the basis of its available resources, absent
some statutory prohibition on doing so. For instance, for agencies with
mass justice responsibilities, such as the Social Security Administration, it
has long been viewed as laudable for the agency to streamline the character
of issues presented in individual adjudications by issuing highly detailed
rules. For such an agency, a valid reason for issuing rules would be that
they will save agency resources in adjudication (though, of course, such
rules typically have other values as well, such as promoting internal consistency). Budgets matter to agencies, and the costs of administration for the
agency may count as a reason for the agency to issue rules, or to issue specific types of rules.
Commentators have suggested that the same unbounded capacity to
consider such institutional costs does not obtain in judicial adjudication.
Judge Richard Posner, for instance, has gestured at the idea that there is a
limit to a judge's capacity to consider judicial economy and docket limiting
considerations, such as that a particular result or construction will open
"floodgates" to litigation.so These considerations reflect judges' views of
the likely costs of a decision to the judiciary or to a particular system of
courts. Posner has argued that in areas of jurisdiction and procedure "where
judicial economy is an accepted factor in judicial decision-making," and the
answer to the dispute is "not dictated by precedent or an otherwise authoritative text, judicial economy will inevitably, and justifiably, be one of the
weights that judges put in the balance in making their decisions."" Posner
acknowledges, however, that evaluating caseload considerations as a factor
in the interpretation of the substantive law raises different concerns.52 As to
the consideration of caseload considerations within the elaboration of substantive law, Posner writes that "perhaps the judges do not have the requisite
knowledge and powers for this task and would compromise the perceived
legitimacy of their role if they undertook it other than in cases in which
'judicial economy' is already a recognized factor in the formulation or application of legal doctrine.""
(2009). What I am suggesting for consideration is that a due process norm does provide
some outside constraint on the factors an agency may consider.
50. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 31518 (1996); Toby J. Stem, Comment, FederalJudges and Fearingthe "FloodgatesofLitigation," 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 381 (2003).
51. POSNER, supra note 50, at 315.
52. Id. at 315-317.
53. Id. at 317-18.
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To examine these suggestions with regard to statutory interpretation,
we first can acknowledge that there is a set of statutes for which judicial
economy and caseload management are established and justified considerations. Those statutes include, as Posner suggests, statutes relating to procedure and jurisdiction, as well as statutes otherwise aimed at curtailing federal litigation, such as the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,54 and the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995."1 With regard to these
statutes, there is a basis to presume that a statute empowers the federal
judge to make his or her own estimation of how the particular statutory construction may affect the institutional resources of the federal judiciary. But
with regard to many statutes, the basis for that presumption is not at all
clear. And with regard to that potentially quite large class of statutes, for
the judge to treat caseload limiting factors as considerations bearing on the
substantive interpretation of the statue would raise Judge Posner's concern
of "compromis[ing] the perceived legitimacy of' the judge's role. One account of why legitimacy would be compromised is that such consideration
would run afoul of the rule-obedience due process norm; that is, the judge
would be invoking considerations foreign to the statute to be applied. This
does not imply that cost considerations, such as caseload-limiting factors,
have no place in due process analysis. Under Mathews v. Eldridge and its
progeny," cost is clearly relevant in deciding how much process is due. In
contrast, what I am proposing is that when due process applies, a ruleobedience norm constrains the extent to which the decisionmaker may rely
on costs to the institution as a basis for construing the statute one way or
another.
The implications of this position for agency statutory interpretation are
relatively straightforward. If a due process legality norm constrains the way
in which a court may consider the budget implications of their decisions for
the federal judiciary, the same norm would also constrain agency adjudicators. Not only is due process formally triggered by agency adjudication,57
54. Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 801, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 (codified in part at 42
U.S.C. § 1997e) (with respect to claims by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regard prison
conditions act requires administrative exhaustion, sets cap on attorneys fees, limits recovery
to claims based on physical injury, and authorizes district courts to dismiss actions on court's
own motion).
55. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 737 (1995) (codified in relevant part at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4) (imposing heightened pleading standard, imposing additional burden on
class representatives, and making Rule 11 sanctions mandatory); see Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and
Private Enforcement of Rule 1Ob-5, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1301, 1335 (2008) (noting litigation-restricting aim of PSLRA).
56. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
57. Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908) (holding that due
process is triggered by individual tax assessments); United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co.,
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but the fairness rationale for the rule-obedience norm also applies. In contrast, because due process is not triggered in a garden-variety rulemaking
proceeding involving general issues of policy," the rule-obedience norm
would not impose the same limitation on the range of considerations, such
as budget considerations, relied upon by the agency in rulemaking as in
adjudication. This differential constraint on the considerations that the
agency may rely upon provides further support for the idea that agency statutory interpretation may be, at least in part, a function of the form through
which the agency acts. As in the case of political considerations, ideas
linked to due process draw agency interpretation more closely to judicial
statutory interpretation in the context of formal agency adjudication than in
agency rulemaking.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR A CHESTNUT

The discussion thus far has meant to suggest two ways in which an
agency's approach to statutory interpretation depends in part on the policymaking form through which it is acting. Specifically, I have argued that
agency statutory interpretation is more closely aligned with judicial interpretation in formal adjudication than in notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Of course, there are many other dimensions of difference between agency
and judicial interpretation as well as many other forms of agency action.
Much work remains to be done to describe and understand the weight of
different interpretive considerations in different policymaking forms. But if
this basic dependence of agency interpretation on policymaking form is
right, it adds an element to our understanding of the agency's choice of policymaking form.
One of the most time-honored principles in administrative law is, as
noted above, that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication "lies
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency."" The
conventional understanding of the agency's choice of policymaking form is
that these forms constitute a fixed menu of options for the agency, each with
distinctive features. As Professor Elizabeth Magill notes, the principal differences between these policymaking forms have traditionally been understood to "run along three dimensions: the procedure the agency must follow,
410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973) (noting classic distinction that due process applies where small
number of individuals affected on individual grounds, as in adjudication).
58. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1915)
(holding that due process does not apply where a large number of people are affected, such
as city-wide property tax increases); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 392 n.462 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (noting general rule that due process clause imposes no constraints on notice-andcomment rulemaking beyond those imposed by statute).
59. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
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the legal effects of the agency's action, and the availability and intensity of
judicial examination of the agency's action."'
One upshot of the ideas I have sketched is that there is another significant dimension to this choice: the choice of policymaking form may also
imply a different approach to statutory interpretation. In particular, our inquiry suggests that the latitude to incorporate political preferences as well as
budgetary concerns is greater in the context of notice-and-comment rulemaking than in formal adjudication. If policymaking form constrains the
range of interpretive options available to the agency, that constraint may be
a significant factor in the agency's choice of policymaking form. Put
another way, if, as is often the case, an agency seeks a particular interpretive
outcome, it will select its policymaking form to fit.

60. Magill, supra note 4, at 1390; see also Russell L. Weaver, Chenery 1I: A FortyYear Retrospective, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 161, 198-207 (1988) (comparing treatment of legislative and adjudicative "rules").
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